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AESTRACT 
There are several theories of risk which indicate that risk could be a function only 
of variance and expectation. A transformation on odds or skewness was constructed 
which left the variance and expectation of a gamble unchanged. Perceived risk was 
clearly a function of this transformation as well as variance and expectation, even 
under multiple play in which the effect of the central limit theorem modifies the effect 
of skewness but it remains a relevant variable. 
COOMBS and HUANG (1970) investigated the structure of perceived 
risk by proposing that certain transformations defined on gambles 
induce corresponding subjective transformations on the perceived risk 
of those gambles. They further proposed that the conjoint effect of those 
subjective transformations would have a particular polynomial form. This 
theory was tested by conjoint measurement methods (KRANTZ and 
TVERSKY, 1970), using two-outcome gambles of the form g = (JJ, p, z), 
in which the outcome y occurs with probability p otherwise z, y, 3 z. 
The transformations on gambles which were used in the study were 
a(g)= (Y+ 6 l/&z-4, (1) 
b(g) = (v + b, l/Z z + b), (2) 
c(g) = cv, l/&z) @), (3) 
where a and b are amounts of money and c is a non-negative integer 
indicating the gamble is played c times independently. 
The transformation u(g) E A preserves expectation but directly in- 
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creases variance, expected loss, expected regret, the maximum loss, 
with any of which perceived risk might increase monotonically. 
The transformation b(g) E B increases expectation and such changes 
as it makes in other variables would also tend to decrease perceived risk. 
The transformation c(g) E C tends to multiply the joint effect of u(g) 
and b(g). 
The theory proposed was that corresponding to the transformations 
u(g), b(g), and c(g) on a gamble there existed corresponding subjective 
transformations LY, p, and y on the perceived risk of the gamble, and 
that theirjoint effect was given by the so-called distributive model: 
where R(g) is the riskiness of the gamble. The experimental results sup- 
ported this polynomial over certain other alternative polynomials. 
POLLATSEK and TVERSKY (1970) then provided an axiomatic theory of 
risk and showed that the above polynomial is compatible with it. One 
of the results of their axioms is that risk is a linear function of variance 
and expectation. The proof of this rests heavily on the central limit 
theorem which says that the probability that the outcome of any gamble 
will be in any given interval approaches that of a normal distribution 
with the same mean and variance, as n, the number of times the gamble 
is convoluted with itself (e.g., played n times independently), approaches 
infinity and the outcomes are resealed by multiplying by l/In. Given 
this result and the fact that a normal distribution is completely charac- 
terized by its mean and variance those two parameters-must be sufficient 
to measure the riskiness of a gamble that is not a normal distribution 
provided continuity exists in the risk function, which Pollatsek and 
Tversky assume. 
This result implies that transformations on gambles which do not 
change a gamble’s variance and expectation will leave their risk order 
invariant. An obvious possibility to be investigated is to change the 
probability and at the same time make corrective changes in the variance 
and expectation, so that only the odds are changed. For gambles of the 
form g = (a, l/2, -a), which have expectation zero and variance ~2, the 
transformation : 
Ad = @C’dP~ PI - allpl9) (5) 
where p(g) E P and 0 < p < 1 will change the odds or skewness and will 
leave the expectation and variance unchanged. The further transforma- 
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tions b(g) and c(g) may then be performed. If this transformation p(g), 
does not leave the risk order invariant, then the odds make a contribu- 
tion to perceived risk with variance and expectation held constant. 
If this transformation is found to be relevant to perceived risk then it 
is of interest whether or not the effect can be captured by a simple change 
in the polynomial of eq. (4). Also if this p(g) transformation is a relevant 
variable, then one can independently test the effect of the central limit 
theorem by comparing the effect of skewness on perceived risk at two 
levels of C. 
1. METHOD 
1.1. Subjects 
The Ss were paid student volunteers at the University of Michigan, 
18 men and 9 women. Each S was run individually. 
1.2. Design 
One set of games was generated in a 3 x 3 x 3 matrix by independently 
varying expected value, variance, and probability of winning. The three 
levels of probability used were l/4, l/2, 314. The games at p = l/2 under 
single play (c = 1) are presented in table 1 in dollars as units. 
TABLE 1 
Games for p = l/2, c = 1. 
(4.00, l/2, -4.00) / (4.40, l/2, - 3.60) / (4.80, l/2, -3.20) 
b=O b’=40 
B 
b” = 80 
To generate the games for the other levels of P, the transformation p(g), 
(eq. (5)), was used on the games in the first column in table 1 and then the 
b(g) transformation was applied to obtain the other two levels of expec- 
ted risk. 




A a’= 3.00 
a = 2.00 
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TABLE 2 
Games for p = l/4, c = 1. 
(6.90, l/4, - 2.30) (7.30, l/4, - 1.90) (7.70, l/4, - 1.50) 
(5.19, l/4, - 1.73) / (5.59, l/4, - 1.33) ~ (5.99, l/4, - .93) 
(3.45, l/4, - 1.15) / (3.85, l/4, - .75) 1 (4.25, l/4, - .35) 
b=O b’ = 40 
B 
TABLE 3 
Games for p = 3/4, c = 1. 
b”= 80 
a”= 4.00 (2.30, 3/4, - 6.90) ~ (2.70, 3/4, -6.50) ~ (3.10, 3/4, -6.10) 
A a’= 3.00 (1.73, 3/4, --5.19) j (2.13, 3/4, -4.79) / (2.53, 3/4, - 4.39) 
a = 2.00 (1.15, 3/4, - 3.45) ( (1.55, 3/4, - 3.05) ( (1.95, 3/4, - 2.75) 
b=O b’ = 40 b”= 80 
B 
This set of 3 x 3 x 3 games is called the single play set. A second set 
of games was generated from the first set by a multiple play transfor- 
mation (y, p, z) CC), with C = 24. 
1.3. Stimuli 
The games were printed on cards and embedded in laminated plastic. 
The manner in which single play games were displayed is illustrated 
in fig. 1. 
P’S P$ P=S 
Fig. 1. Types of display for single play games. 
The multiple play games were presented as 25outcome games, each to 
be played once, and displayed in two ways to the Ss. On one side of each 
stimulus card was a graph of the appropriate discrete probability distri- 
bution over money; on the other side was a list of the 25 possible out- 
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Fig. 2. One side of a stimulus card. 
TABLE 4 
The other side of a stimulus card. 
Outcome Probability 








- 4.60 0.113 
- 11.50 0.067 
- 18.40 0.033 
- 25.30 0.014 
- 32.30 0.004 
- 39.10 0.0013 
- 46.00 0.00035 
- 52.90 0.000077 
- 59.80 0.000015 
- 66.70 O.OOOOO23 
- 73.60 o.OOOOoO3 
- 80.50 oBOOoOOO3 
- 87.40 O.oooooooO26 
- 94.30 o.ooooooooo17 
- 101.20 o.ooooooooooo75 
- 108.10 O.oooooooooooO23 
- 115.00 o.oooooooooooooo3 
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comes with their respective probabilities. Examples of the two sides of a 
stimulus card are given in fig. 2 and table 4 in which the single play game 
from which this multiple play game was generated was (2.13, 3/4, -4.79). 
Outcomes with very low probability were suggested by the broad base 
in the figure. On the actual stimulus card the distribution was drawn in 
red. The S, of course, was informed that the actual outcomes and pro- 
babilities were displayed on the reverse of the card. 
1.4. Procedure 
Each S came for three sessions. During the first session, the S rank 
ordered each set of games in terms of their perceived riskiness. A coin 
toss determined which set was ranked first. The second and third sessions 
were a replication of the first. The following version of a method of ac- 
cumulation was used to obtain the rank orders: The S was presented with 
three games, selected for easy discrimination, and told to order them 
according to how risky they appeared. A fourth gamble, randomly 
selected, was then presented and S was told to place it relative to the first 
three. A fifth game was then placed relative to the first four, etc., until all 
27 games were ranked. The S was then asked to check the final ordering 
and to correct any errors of judgment he might have made. 
In judging the multiple play set of games, S was free to use either or 
both sides of the stimulus card. 
2. RESULTS 
2.1. Consistency 
The Ss were rank ordered in consistency based on their average T 
between the three replications on each set of stimuli. Hence, the Ss were 
ranked in consistency on the set of single play games and independently 
ranked in consistency on the set of multiple play games. The t coefficient 
between these two rankings in consistency was itself 0.339. This low 
correlation led us to keep the consistency orderings distinct for the two 
sets of games. In certain further analyses below, then, Ss are divided into 
three subgroups of nine Ss in each, H = highest consistency, M = me- 
dium consistency, and L 3 lowest consistency, based on their consistency 
ranking on the set of single play games and again based on their consist- 
ency ranking on the set of multiple play games. 
The average t for each subgroup for each of the sets of games is given 
in table 5. 
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TABLE 5 
Consistency level (?) of each subgroup for each set of stimuli. 
Subgroup 
H M L Total group 
c= 1 0.922 0.763 0.340 0.678 
c = 24 0.866 0.719 0.478 0.688 
2.2. Eflects of odds 
If the effect of a transformation from the set P is irrelevant to perceived 
risk or relevant but independent of the effect of variance and expectation, 
then the ordering induced on A x B with the levels of P and C fixed should 
be independent of the level of P (cf. KRANTZ and TVERSKY, 1970; COOMBS 
and HUANG, 1970). Furthermore, the ordering induced on P with the 
levels of A x B and of C fixed should be degenerate if P is an irrelevant 
variable or should be invariant over the levels of A x B if the contribution 
of P is independent of the joint effect of A x B. 
These scale-free tests permit us to diagnose whether the effect of the 
change in probability has been emasculated by the corrective changes in 
variance and expectation or whether, if an effect persists, it is independent 
of the effect of variance and expectation. 
Following the notation introduced in COOMBS and HUANG (1970) 
A x B; P: c=l sign&s a test of whether the ordering induced on A x B 
with P and C fixed (C fixed at c= 1) is independent of the level at which P 
is fixed. 
To make this test requires comparing the orderings of S of the games in 
each of the three tables (tables 1,2 and 3), i.e., three orderings of nine 
elements. We used as the criterion level for judging whether a test was 
satisfied the average z that would be obtained if there were exactly one 
pairwise reversal in one of the orderings of nine elements, here a Z of 
0.852. 
The number of Ss who satisfy each of the tests at the indicated criterion 
level are given in table 6. 
Lowering the criterion level for the tests of the independence of A x B 
with respect to P from exactly one pairwise reversal in one of the orderings 
to exactly three independent pairwise reversals in one of the orderings 
lowers 7 to 0.889 but makes no essential change in the results: the 5, 2,0 
in the first column become 6, 3,0 respectively, and the 0, 0, 0 of the 
second column become 1, 0,O for the H, M, and L subgroups. 
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TABLE 6 
Tests of the independence of A x B and P. 
AxB;P:c=l AxB;P:c=24 P;AxB:c=l P;AxB:c=24 
t > 0.963 ? b 0.963 f > 0.850 t 3 0.850 
Test * 
H 5 0 9 9 
M 2 0 7 9 
L 0 0 6 7 
Total 7 0 22 25 
* Cell entries are the number of Ss out of niue who satisfy the test. 
The first two tests in table 6 indicate that P is still a relevant variable 
in spite of having no effect on variance and expectation, especially under 
multiple play. This is confirmed by the last two tests in table 6 which 
indicate that the contribution of the P transformation to pereived risk 
is independent of the contribution from the joint effect of A x B. 
2.3. Test of the effect of the central limit theorem 
Table 7 contains the mean rank of the nine games at each level of P 
and C for each S. The mean rank of the 27 games at each level of C is, of 
course 14, so the sum of each row of the table is a constant 42. At each 
level of C the mean absolute deviation about 14 was calculated and 
these two quantities were compared for each S. The larger this deviation 
the greater the effect of the P transformation on risk. 
The mean absolute deviation was greater for c= 1 than for c= 24 for 23 
of the 27 Ss. A sign test for matched pairs yields a z = 3.46 which is sig- 
nificant (p < 0.001). This result is consistent with the notion that multiple 
play assuages the influence of probability on risk perception. 
In addition to the general effect of multiple play on the influence of 
skewness on risk there is within the subject an effect that is independent and 
which is of interest for descriptive purposes primarily. At c= 1 odds for 
or against may differentially effect risk and then multiple play may have a 
further differential effect. We shall speak of a game with p=3/4 played 
once or the same game under multiple play as a negatively skewed game 
(see fig. 2 for an example). Similarly a game withp= l/4 or a game genera- 
ted from such a game will be spoken of as a positively skewed bet. 
The basic data are presented in table 8. As may be seen, at single play 
about two-thirds of the Ss regard unfavorable odds as riskier (with ex- 
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TABLE 7 
Mean rank * of the nine games at each level of P and C for each S. 
S# c P S# 





































10.78 16.67 14.55 
16.67 14.33 11.00 
12.44 18.56 11.00 
14.11 12.11 15.78 
14.77 16.88 10.35 
17.00 14.00 11.00 
6.00 15.00 21.00 
13.44 14.00 14.56 
5.00 14.00 23.00 
19.90 13.44 8.66 
23.00 14.00 5.00 
11.00 8.33 22.67 
23.00 14.00 5.00 
15.00 14.44 12.56 
5.00 14.00 23.00 
13.11 15.55 13.33 
10.33 17.00 14.67 
17.33 14.55 10.12 
20.89 12.33 8.78 
14.67 14.55 12.78 
19.44 14.33 8.23 
14.55 13.89 11.56 
5.00 16.56 20.44 
14.22 12.56 15.22 
5.00 14.00 23.00 
17.78 16.11 8.11 
16.88 14.55 10.57 





















































































* The higher the rank the riskier the game. 
pectation and variance controlled) but under multiple play this relation 
appears not to hold and may even be reversed. There are only 7 Ss (the 
main diagonal) for whom the relation of risk to skewness is the same 
under single and multiple play. For 20 of the Ss this relation was reversed. 
A count made from table 7 indicates that there were 21 Ss for whom 
negative skewness got relatively riskier under multiple play as against 
only 10 for whom positive skewness got relatively riskier. There were 
24 C. H. COOMBS AND J. H. BOWEN 
TABLE 8 
Effect of multiple play on the relation of skewness to perceived risk. 
Multiple play 
(c = 24) 
Negative skewness Positive skewness 
riskier than riskier than 
positive skewness negative skewness 
__- -.__ 
Negative skewness riskier 
than positive skewness, 
(favorable odds riskier) 2* I 9 
Positive skewness riskier 
than negative skewness, 
(unfavorable odds riskier) 13 5 18 
15 12 
* Number of Ss. 
also four Ss, for whom the effect of multiple play was to make any skewed 
games riskier relative to the effect on symmetric games. 
These relations could reflect inherent interactions which the methods 
of conjoint measurement are well suited to test. This analysis is dis- 
cussed next. 
2.4. Diagnostic properties for polj nomials 
It might be conjectured that the four variables with which this study 
is concerned, A, B, P and C induce four corresponding transformations 
on perceived risk whose joint effect can be represented by a simple poly- 
nomial, a simple polynomial being one obtained by either the successive 
addition or multiplication of the four variables in some sequence. 
There are, altogether, 48 possible polynomials of that kind and this 
study is too limited for complete diagnosis by conjoint measurement 
methods, particularly in view of the possibility that one of the variables 
(p) may generate sign-dependencies. It is possible, however, to draw some 
inferences so the results of the tests that could be made are presented 
here in tables 9 and 10. 
The tables report the number of Ss out of a possible nine in each cell 
who satisfy the test in question at the level indicated by the Z at the top 
of each column. The higher ? reflects exactly one pairwise reversal in one 
ordering of the three orderings of 5 elements. The lower ? reflects exactly 
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TABLB 9 
Tests* of diagnostic properties for polynomials under single play, c = 1. 
Interplane tests 
AxB;P P; AXB AXP; B B; AxP BxP; A A; BXP 
f> %> r> t> f> i> rg3 f> t> 
0.963 0.889 0.852 0.963 0.889 0.852 0.963 0.889 0.852 
______ 
H 5 6 9 7 8 6 1 6 I 
M 2 3 7 1 5 6 0 2 6 
L 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Total 7 9 22 8 13 13 1 8 14 
Intraplane tests 
A;P:B P;A:B A;B:P B;A:P B;P:A P;B:A 
t > 0.852 t > 0.852 f 2 0.852 5 > 0.852 t > 0.852 % > 0.852 
H 7 9 9 6 7 9 
M 6 7 7 6 6 7 
L 1 6 1 1 1 6 
Total 14 22 17 13 14 22 
* Cells report the number of Ss out of nine who satisfy the test in question at the 
level indicated. 
three independent pairwise reversals in one of the three orderings on nine 
elements. 
Because our fourth variable, C, is represented at only two levels and 
there are no data on orderings induced on C we will only examine the 
simple polynomials involving the functions corresponding to the 
transformations A, B, and P. These models in three variables are as fol- 
lows : 
rl + 12 + r-3 additive model, 
(rl + r2)rs distributive model, 
rv2 + r3 
nr2r3 
dual distributive model, 
multiplicative model. 
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TABLE 10 
Tests* of diagnostic properties for polynomials under multiple play, c = 24. 
Interplane tests 
AxB;P P;AxB AxP;B B;AxP BxP;A A;BxP 
f> 5 --> 5, 73 s> f_> ig? f > t, - ‘.> ?I2 
0.963 0.889 0.852 0.963 0.889 0.852 0.963 0.889 0.852 
H 0 1 9 1 6 3 1 4 2 
M 0 0 9 0 2 3 1 3 1 
L 0 0 7 0 2 5 0 2 2 
Total 0 1 25 1 10 11 2 9 5 
Intraplane tests 
A;P:B P;A:B A;B:P B;A:P B;P:A P;B:A 
f> 0.852 t> 0.852 f> 0.852 %> 0.852 f> 0.852 f> 0.852 
H 3 9 2 2 2 9 
M 1 9 1 3 3 9 
L 4 7 2 5 5 -I 
Total 8 25 5 11 11 25 
* Cells report the number of Ss out of nine who satisfy the test in question at the 
level indicated. 
For simplicity of exposition we shall use the letters A, B, C, and P in 
particular polynomials to represent the subjective functions on perceived 
risk induced by the corresponding mathematical transformations on 
games. 
If a single variable is mutually independent with the joint effect of 
the remaining variables it is called semiadditive. We see from table 9 that 
B x P is not independent of A at a stringent level (only 1 S out of 27) and 
even at a weaker level only about 30 % of the Ss (8 out of 27) satisfy 
independence so we conclude that B x P and A are not mutually indepen- 
dent and so A is not semiadditive. 
The additive model requires that each of the three variables be semi- 
additive so it may be rejected. There remain the possibilities th. there 
are two, one, or zero semiadditive factors. 
If there are exactly two semiadditive fC ors then none of the four 
models is possible. 
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If there is exactly one it must be P or B. If B is the semiadditive factor 
then AP + B or (A+P)B are possibilities. In either case A and P should 
be mutually interdependent and we see from the bottom half of table 10 
that this appears to be the case. 
If P is the semiadditive factor then AB + P or (A + B)P are possibili- 
ties. In either case A and B should be mutually independent and we see 
from the bottom half of table 9 that they appear to be. 
If there are no semiadditive factors then the distributive and the mul- 
tiplicative model are possibilities. The multiplicative model may be 
rejected because every factor must be at least mutually sign-dependent 
and, as noted in rejecting the additive model, A does not satisfy this 
condition. For the distributive model with no semiadditive factors there 
must be exactly one which is at least mutually sign-dependent and the 
remaining pair must be mutually independent. For these three variables, 
then, with C fixed at c= 1 the three polynomials that are not clearly 
eliminated are AP + B, (A + B)P, and AB + P. 
If we turn to table 10, with Cfixed at c = 24 it is clear that there are no 
semiadditive factors, so only (A + B)P remains a possibility. But then A 
and B must be mutually independent and the bottom half of table 10 
(columns 3 and 4) leaves that prospect very suspect. 
3. DISCUSSION 
It is clear from this experiment that varying the odds without changing 
the variance or expectation still causes substantial changes in perceived 
risk. As a consequence any theory that requires risk to be a function 
solely of variance and expectation is violated. We note that the effect of 
odds is especially marked under multiple play. 
It should be pointed out that the substantial effect observed here of the 
central limit theorem on perceived risk is obtained under display condi- 
tions in which the distribution obtained under multiple play is explicitly 
presented. Whether these same results would have been obtained if a 
2-outcome game were presented with the information that it was to be 
played 24 times is in serious doubt. In the case of a few Ss, after the 
experiment was concluded, some pairs of 2-outcome games were presen- 
ted and S was asked to judge which was riskier if the games were to be 
played 24 times. Almost invariably the Ss responded the same as they 
did to the games under single play. This is very clearly not what happened 
when they were presented with complete information about the effect of 
playing 24 times. 
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Such a difference could reflect a failure in mental arithmetic, uninform- 
ed biases, or a real psychological difference in perceived risk in that if 
it can happen all at once it has a different riskiness than if it happens in 
successive stages like a random walk. 
If all simple 4-variable polynomials are rejected there are at least two 
possibilities to consider. One possibility is that the effect of a given 
mathematical transformation on a game may be mediated by more 
than one psychological transformation on risk. For example, the effect 
of the transformation P may be mediated by one function interacting 
with that for the A transformation and another function interacting 
with that for the B transformation, say P’ and P”, in which case the poly- 
nomial could take the form AP’ + BP”, a form not tested in this ex- 
periment. 
A second possibility is that the transformation P utilized here is not 
the one best suited for combining with A, B, and C in a simple poly- 
nomial. Alternative transformations which effect neither expectation nor 
variance or exactly one could be more suitable for the purpose. 
(Accepted September.14, 1970.) 
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